The paper provides a systematic account of Kant's 'right to be somewhere' as introduced in the Doctrine of Right. My claim is that Kant's concern with the concurrent existence of a plurality of corporeal agents on the earth's surface (to which the right speaks) occupies a rarely appreciated conceptual space in his mature political philosophy. In grounding a particular kind of moral relation that is 'external' (as located in bounded space) but not property-mediated, it provides us with a fundamentally new perspective on Kant's cosmopolitanism, which I construe as a cosmopolitanism for 'earth dwellers'.
Introduction
In one of the most enigmatic yet fascinating passages of the Doctrine of Right, Kant ascribes to all human beings a 'right to be wherever nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them' (DoR 6: 262) . 1 Interpreters have rarely explored the systematic role of this right to be somewhere within the wider structure of Kant's political philosophy or assigned it much prominence, usually focusing instead on the antecedent property argument and its relation to the (ensuing) duty of state entrance, or the details of Kant's account of public right and its institutional implications both domestically and internationally. 2 In the present paper, I aim to make up for this neglect. My claim is that systematic reflection on the right to be somewhere offers a vital insight into the structural significance of embodied agency under conditions of spatial constraint in the Doctrine of Right. Kant's concern with the concurrent existence of a plurality of corporeal agents on the spherical surface of the earth occupies a conceptual space that is insufficiently appreciated by interpreters of his mature political philosophy. I will argue that it grounds a particular kind of moral relation that is 'external' (as located in time and space), but not property-mediated. 3 Awareness of this moral relation also provides us with a fundamentally new perspective on Kant's cosmopolitanism, which I construe as a cosmopolitanism for 'earth dwellers'.
The argument proceeds as follows: I start with a sketch of the right to be somewhere as introduced in the Doctrine of Right's section on private right. Section 2 points out the difficulty of making sense of this right within the broader architectonic of the work,
given that it eludes classification with regard to Kant's vital characterization of all rights as either 'innate' or 'acquired'. Section 3 develops a novel reading of the conceptual foundation of Kant's global thinking based on this reconstruction: his cosmopolitanism is neither one of 'noumenal' beings united in their shared humanity, nor of legalinstitutional membership in a shared polity, but one of physical beings that act and affect one another in virtue of inhabiting one (limited) space.
Original Acquisition of Land and the Right to be Somewhere
One of the reasons why the right to be somewhere may have largely slipped interpreters' attention is its somewhat marginal position in the text. Kant introduces it only after the famously obscure property argument , the details of which I want to bracket here despite the fact that it has recently taken centre stage in exegetical disputes about the Doctrine of Right as a whole. 4 Having opened the section on 'private right' with reflections on the conditions of having something external as one's own -in a nutshell, it is (conclusively) possible only in a civil condition (DoR 6: 255) -Kant turns to the question how objects can be rightfully acquired (DoR 6: 258).
In particular, he is interested in the possibility of acquiring something originally, as opposed to deriving it from what belongs to someone else (through a contractual exchange). It is in this context that Kant makes the crucial claim that all human beings are originally (i.e., prior to any act of choice that establishes a right) in a possession of land that is in conformity with right, that is, they have a right to be wherever nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them.
(DoR 6: 262)
We need to take a closer look at the more immediate context in which this passage occurs. The preceding paragraph provides a first hint why Kant would talk about something like a right to a place on earth in the context of his discussion of rightful acquisition. There he asserts that 'first acquisition of a thing can only be acquisition of land' (DoR 6: 261) . This claim is no less puzzling. Is he saying that I need to own the land in order to possess something that is placed on it? That would be odd -while there may be a sense in which stable enjoyment of my property right in my car may depend on my ability to park it on a ground that I have secure access to, my ownership right in itself cannot be contingent on that. Yet, note that Kant is not talking here about ownership in the sense of private property (something which I can claim as mine regardless of whether I am physically connected to it) at all, but about mere physical possession or occupation. Consequently, he is not referring to land in the sense of a fenced-in plot of territory -described as 'residence (sedes), a chosen and therefore an acquired lasting possession' -but merely as 'habitable ground' (DoR 6: 261) . I want to suggest that what Kant is doing here is reflecting on the circumstances of embodied
agency. An embodied agent I take to be a morally accountable corporeal being capable of acting in time and space. As beings of that kind, humans inevitably make a particular kind of seizure: the piece of land that they take up in virtue of the very fact that they are spatially extended. Without a place on earth, we couldn't act and hold others morally accountable for their actions, let alone claim objects as 'ours'. Cases like that of refugees or stateless persons illustrate how failing to have one's place on earth secured, and hence being vulnerable to the arbitrary choices of others, essentially deprives humans of their moral agency (Ypi 2014 : 294-5, Flikschuh 2000 . So it is the very nature of human existence that entails that people's relationship to the land precedes their relationship to other external things.
This gives us a sense why reflection on the circumstances of human agency might lead to something like the idea of a right to be somewhere. And it also provides a possible explanation for the right's puzzling position in the text: Kant can be read to regress from reflections on the possibility of property rights to the more fundamental condition of raising anything like a claim to an object as 'ours' in the first place: being acknowledged a place on earth is a necessary presupposition of claiming rights in
things. Yet, reading on from the pertinent passage, the picture gets more complicated.
Kant goes on to introduce another fundamental material factor -besides our own embodiment -that conditions human existence: the earth's spherical surface. The finitude of the globe, he explains unites all places on its surface, for if its surface were an unbounded plane, people could be so dispersed on it that they would not come into any community with one another, and community would not then be a necessary result of their existence on the earth. Flikschuh 2000: 157) . We just are the kinds of beings that, in virtue of pursuing projects and holding each other morally accountable within time and space, need to be somewhere. On the other hand, while entering the world itself is not something we choose to do, the very fact that we enter the world with the capacity for choice and action has normative implications: it implies that 'the choice of one is unavoidably opposed by nature to that of another' (DoR 6: 267) . And what it is to be an embodied agent -not just a physical entity taking up space -is to be able to grasp, and account for, the normative implications of this fact.
Kant resolves this dilemma, I want to claim, by attaching strings to the right to be somewhere, namely, to conceive of our own legitimate possession of a place as a 'possession in common' (DoR 6: 262) with all others. To think of the earth's surface as possessed in common, that is to say, is an a priori necessary condition of the unavoidable act of first acquisition in virtue of one's coming into the world as an embodied agent. While we have a right to be somewhere (otherwise we could not act),
we also need to take into account that the piece of space we take up at every particular point in time cannot be taken up by any other person. And given that, as Kant explains elsewhere, 'originally no one had more right than another to be on a place on the earth' (PP 8: 358), we can do so only by thinking of the earth's surface as commonly owned.
Kant thus employs the idea of original common possession of the earth in order to visually express what it means to exist as an embodied moral agent, together with other such agents, within limited space, namely, to acknowledge that the corollary of one's own right to be somewhere is one's acknowledgement of others' equal right.
While I will return to the notion of original common possession in the last section, let us take stock of this section's attempt to get a first grasp of the right to be somewhere.
Despite our exclusive focus on a close textual engagement with the relevant passage, we can already identify two ways in which it seems to be of broader significance for Kant's mature political philosophy as a whole. First, the right to be somewhere provides us with a crucial insight into a fundamental problem that the Doctrine of Right is concerned with: corporeal agents that have to share the earth in common with a plurality of agents of the same kinds. At this level, we may say, Kant's political thinking is concerned with humans qua 'earth dwellers' (Byrd 2009: 107 Note that a particular significance of this distinction lies in the different scope of inclusion of the two moral domains that the categories respectively ground. On the one hand, the innate right is something all free and finite beings have 'in virtue of [our] humanity'. In contrast, acquired rights (as Kant will argue in subsequent sections) are possible only in the 'civil condition', that is under a general will that makes coercive public laws valid for everyone (e.g. DoR 6: 255). The pertinent kind of property relations are thus relations among co-citizens sharing membership in an empirical
institution that embodies such a will. Acquired right is not only more momentous in its implications (ultimately yielding state entrance), the conditions of its possibility are also much more challenging to vindicate and require Kant to engage in a complicated deduction (DoR 6: 249). Given the architectural momentousness of the distinction between the two categories of rights, we would of course like to know how Kant has solved the puzzle that caused him so much headache in drafting the work: is the right to be somewhere an acquired or an innate right?
The Right to be Somewhere as an Acquired Right?
The intuitively most plausible answer is of course to classify the right to be somewhere as an acquired right. At least this is what Kant's own placement of the notion in the text seems to unequivocally suggest. As seen in the first section, it is introduced in the Doctrine of Right's section on private right, more specifically in the part that is concerned with the question 'how to acquire something external' (DoR 6: 258).
Moreover, this reading seems to be in line with Kant's conceptual map as just outlined.
Recall that, as we were told earlier, rights in external objects require an act to be established. The definitional point was to distinguish acquired rights from that which is ours innately or, in Kant-speak, 'internally'. It seems to follow that anything external to me that I claim as mine must fall under the category of acquired right. My place on earth, as occupied by my physical self, is of course external to me. And there is surely a sense in which I 'acquire' a place on earth in virtue of being born. Yet three reasons strongly speak against treating the right to be somewhere as an acquired right. 249). 7 Importantly, however, the right to be somewhere is limited to physical possession, or occupation. It is not a right to this or that specific place (that we could claim even in our absence), but a right to be granted a place somewhere on the earth such that the conditions of embodied agency are fulfilled. Consequently, Kant specifies in a footnote, 'merely physical possession of land (holding it) is already a right to a thing, though certainly not of itself sufficient for regarding it as mine' (DoR 6: 251).
Hence, he continues, the right to be somewhere is 'consistent with the principle of outer freedom' (ibid.) and does not require a deduction in order to be vindicated -notably unlike acquired rights, from which it must thus be systematically distinct.
Second, while acquired rights require an act to be established, it is highly questionable whether our coming into the world is to be considered an act in the relevant sense. 2003: 199) . This textual ambiguity, however, need not undermine our primary negative conclusion. For the least we can say is that Kant is very hesitant to suggest Bringing this section to a close, the right to be somewhere seems to be a rather recalcitrant notion. Our systematic reflections have shown that it cannot be made to fit either of the categories of innate or acquired right. My aim was not to question the usefulness of this distinction as an overall organizing principle for the Doctrine of Right, but to cast some doubt upon its exhaustiveness. I have pointed out that the moral relation that emanates from insight into the normative implications of our concurrent existence, as embodied agents, on the earth displays features of both categories and ultimately eludes classification. Relations among earth dwellers can be neither accounted for by the status that innate right (however specified) endows us with, nor can it be reduced to membership in man-made political institutions like the modern state. That there is such a conceptual space is occasionally even acknowledged in passing by interpreters. Herb and Ludwig (1993: 294) for instance remark that human beings enter the world as 'beings who are subject to obligations which are neither innate nor freely assumed through an act that establishes an obligation'. The implications of this puzzling insight, however, are rarely systematically explored. The main reason for this is the general likening in the literature -admittedly following Kant's own presentation -of external relations to property relations. Given its marginal position in the text, the fact that relations among earth dwellers are external but not propertymediated easily slips attention. Yet it constitutes an essential concern of Kant's throughout the mature political philosophy that, as I hope to show in the next section, is particularly crucial for his cosmopolitanism.
Earth Dwellers and Cosmopolitan Right
In the last section, I have argued that the right to be somewhere proves unwieldly with regard to a conceptual distinction central to Kant's body. In contrast to both these dominant approaches, I want to suggest that it is the right to be somewhere on which Kant's global community is modelled. In order to make good on that claim, we need to get a better grip on the moral status that actually pertains to humans qua earth dwellers. In which way precisely does the spatial or territorial dimension of human agency shape our coexistence and what does it mean to account for this fact? Is there an identifiable set of entitlements connected to our status as earth dwellers?
Unfortunately, the sparse passages on 'private right' that we have focused on so far What Niesen takes to be the common denominator in these two examples is an affirmation of the fact that 'we need to be somewhere rather than nowhere, and that we need to use and appropriate territory and territorially based stuff' (Niesen forthcoming: 20) . The right to be somewhere, Niesen thus concludes, includes a substantive set of entitlements that account for the 'territory-based nature of human lives' (ibid.), or as he calls it, our 'earth citizenship'. The idea of territory-based entitlements is meant quite I think these questions will ultimately have to remain unanswered and point to the limits of Kant's practical philosophy: taking its cue from the fundamental (yet highly controversial) distinction between 'noumena' and 'phenomena', it construes moral relations as formal and a priori. We have seen in the last section that, in line with this general outlook, his political philosophy is concerned with the reciprocal relation between the choices of free and finite embodied reasoners. Contra Niesen, our empirical existence as vulnerable beings with bodily needs cannot have direct rights-grounding justificatory force, such that their very structure might be taken to equip us with substantive entitlements, for instance when it comes to the distribution of resources and land. This is why I think Niesen's analysis of the right to be somewhere in terms of 'earth citizenship' ultimately overestimates the extent to which we can actually get anything as substantive as a set of territory-based entitlements out of it.
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In the remainder of this section, I will thus contrast Niesen's substantial reading of the right to be somewhere with a more formal or relational one that suggests a different way as one of 'common possession', I want to suggest, is to point out that the political problematic is fundamentally and irreducibly global for Kant -that humans both need to and are able to get to grips with the fact that they have to share the earth in common.
They need to do so because of the systematic interdependence that obtains among individuals globally just in virtue of the reciprocal relation between their choices and the ensuing 'unavoidable unity' of all places on the earth. Moreover, they are capable of critically relating to their own respective standpoints and normatively structuring the common space they share.
Against this background, we can re-read the section on cosmopolitan right with a focus on the mode of interaction among embodied agents it prescribes. It is not so much prior entitlements that individuals bring to bear in their encounters with each other and other states or peoples, but it is a certain way to be dealt with that they can claim. As guests, they may 'present themselves for community ' (PP 8: 358) or at least offer to engage in (not demand!) cultural, economic or political exchange ('commerce', DoR 6: 352).
Guests may pass through, but -unless refusal involves their 'destruction' -not stay against the will of the inhabitants; that is the case even if the inhabitants fail to accord with their view of what it is to make proper use of territory. A good example is the case of non-state peoples, where Kant prescribes to representatives of European states that want to settle on the territory of nomadic peoples to deal with the native inhabitants on a contractual basis (DoR 6: 353) . That is, they must treat the claims of all those involved in the exchange with strict equality and refrain from making deceptive or fraudulent offers or persuade them into selling the lands on which they live. It is this requirement to interact on the basis of strict reciprocity, as illustrated through the model of a contractual relation, that I take to be at the normative core of cosmopolitan right. Kant's cosmopolitanism for earth dwellers is -in line with the relationalism characterizing his practical philosophy more generally -concerned with the quality of human interactions, not the quality of matter.
Let me end this section with a reminder that we should be wary of reducing Kant 
Conclusion
The aim of this essay was to clarify the status, and indeed bring out the conceptual importance, of the right to be somewhere in Kant's political philosophy. My claim was not only that sustained analysis of the notion provides a crucial insight into an underappreciated concern (working out the normative implications of the coexistence of corporeal agents on the earth's spherical surface), but furthermore that it comes with a novel perspective on his global thinking. On the emerging picture, Kant's cosmopolitanism is neither one of noumenal beings united in their shared humanity, nor of actual world citizens sharing a global polity. Instead, it is a cosmopolitanism of earth dwellers: embodied rational agents in direct physical confrontation with other such agents, with which they have to share the globe in common. This is a cosmopolitanism that does not in itself offer effortless institutional guidance for a just world, but rather provides agents with something like a global standpoint from which to think and act.
This shift of focus away from concrete prescriptive recommendations for a global political order, to a certain way of framing the problem, goes against the grain of how Kant's political thought tends to be read nowadays: it is the former that interpreters typically look for in essays such as Perpetual Peace. But it is the latter, I hope to have
shown, that is both most appealing about Kant's cosmopolitanism, and has so far remained largely underexplored. announces. While Ludwig (1988) suggests a relocation of part of §2 to §6 in order to replace what he considers the missing deduction, others like Byrd and Hruschka (2010) resist that move.
